Socialism in India : The KGB X Indira Gandhi Impact
AUTHOR : SHIKHA MISHRA
INTRODUCTION
Neither Jawaharlal Nehru nor the Intelligence Bureau, Although, realized how exhaustively the Indian embassy in Moscow was being infiltrated by the KGB, using its accustomed varieties of the decoy. The Indian envoys PRO-KHOR was enlisted, likely in the before time 1950s, with the help of a female, devoured, cognomen NEVEROVA, who apparently seduced him. The KGB has evidently contended with the substance which PRO-KHOR provided, which comprised on two occasions the embassy codebook and deciphering tables since in 1954 it raised his monthly remittance from 1,000 to 4,000 rupees. Another Indian envoys, RADAR, was appointed in 1956, also with the support of a swallow, who on this occasion affirmed to be pregnant. A third KGB swallow impels a cipher clerk in the Indian embassy, ARTUR, to go deliberately into debt conducive to make it easier to compromise him. He was recruited as an agent in 1957 after being trapped (likely in illegal currency trading) by a KGB official purporting as a black-marketer. Consequently, these and other infiltrators of the embassy, Soviet cryptanalysts, were likely able to decrypt meaningful numbers of Indian diplomatic communications.
As KGB operations in India enlarged throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the headquarters of the KGB seems to have located the extent of the Intelligence Bureau’s preceding infiltration of the CPI. Since the 1960s KGB infiltration of the Indian intelligence organizations and other parts of its ceremonial bureaucracy had authorized it to turn the tables on the Intelligence Bureau. After the KGB became the main culvert for both money and confidential communications from Moscow, high-level Intelligence Bureau infiltration of the CPI became much more strenuous. As in other Communist parties, this confidential channel was known only to a small inner circle within the supervision. In 1959 Ajoy Gosh, PCI General Secretary agreed with the Delhi residency on a proposition to found an import-export business for dealings with the Soviet bloc, presided by a senior Party member codenamed DED, whose revenue would hold off for party reserves. Within little more than a decade, its annual reserves had risen to over 3 million rupees. The Soviet news agency Novosti furnishes further subsidies by regularly paying the CPI publishing house at a rate of 50 percent in excess of its normal charges.
Mission Critical
The KGB’s initial contact with Indira Gandhi had taken place during her initial visit to the Soviet Union a few months after Stalin’s death in 1953. As well as keeping her under sustained monitoring, the Second Chief Directorate also encompassed her with handsome, alert male enthusiasts. Unknowing of the consonance of her welcome by the KGB, Indira was amazed by the attention showered on her. However, she did not put forward the male admirers in letters to her father, she wrote to him, “Everybody? the Russians ? have been so sweet to me. I am being recourse like everybody’s the only daughter? I must be overindulged by the time I leave. Nobody has ever been so nice to me.” Indira wrote of a holiday scheduled for her on the Black Sea, “I don’t think I have had such a holiday for years.” Later in Leningrad, she told Nehru that she was “lying around luxury”. After Two years Indira goes along with her father on his initial office visit to the Soviet Union. Like Nehru, she was apparently influenced by the apparent successes of Soviet planning and economic modernization manifested to them in carefully stage-managed visits to Russian factories. In the course of her trip, Khrushchev presented her with a mink coat which became one of the favorite articles in her wardrobe? Apart from the fact that a few years earlier she had criticized the female Indian diplomat in Moscow for accepting a similar offering.
Soviet attempts to prepare Indira Gandhi during the 1950s were motivated far more by the inclination to impress her father than by any awareness of her own political prospects. Like both the Congress association and the CPI, Moscow still misconstrued her when she became Prime Minister. During her early presence in parliament, Mrs. Gandhi seemed inarticulate and unable to think on her feet. The derogatory nickname created by a socialist Member of Parliament, Dumb Doll, began to stick. Moscow’s plan of action during 1966 for the Indian elections in the following year was formed on uplifting the CPI and the insurgent Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPM) to join together in a left-wing association to oppose Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress govt. As well as financing the CPI and some other left-wing alliances at the time of the 1967 election campaign, the KGB also financed the campaigns of various agents and secret contacts in Congress. The most senior agent recognized in the files noted by Mitrokhin was a minister who deplored ABAD, who was contemplated by the KGB as “utmost influential”.
KGB ties of Indira Gandhi
In the time of the election campaign, the KGB also made substantial use of active measures, many of them based on counterfeit American documents produced by Service A. An agent in the information division of the US embassy in New Delhi, deplored MIKHAIL, provided instances of documents and examples of signatures to accommodate in the production of convincing forgeries. Amidst the operations officers who imparted the forgeries produced for the 1967 election campaign was Yuri Modin, former controller of the Cambridge ‘Resplendent Five’. In an effort to disfrace S.K. Patil, one of the popular anti-Communists in the Congress association, Modin transmitted a forged letter from the US consul-general in Bombay (presently known as Mumbai) to the American envoys in New Delhi implying to Patil’s “political interest with the Pakistanis” and the huge American subsidies apparently given to him. However, Patil was one of the superior Congress politicians trounced at the election, it endures difficult to assess how much he trounces owed to KGB active measures.
Oleg Kalugin, who became chief of in 1973, recollected India as a model of KGB percolation of a Third World govt, “We had scores of derivations extensively the Indian government in intelligence, counter-intelligence, the Foreign and Defense Ministries and the police. In 1978 Directorate K, whose responsibilities comprised the discernment of foreign intelligence and security agencies, was running, by Line KR in the Indian habitation, over 30 agents, ten of whom were Indian intelligence officials. Kalugin remembers one instance on which Andropov personally turned down an offer from an Indian minister to provide information in return for $50,000 since the KGB was beforehand well supplied with material from the Indian Defence and Foreign Ministries: It appeared like the whole country was for sale; the KGB ? had enormously infiltrated the Indian government. Nevertheless, neither side deputed sensitive and secret information to the Indians, realizing their combatant would know all about it the next day.
The KGB, in Kalugin’s thought, was more successful than the CIA, somewhat since of its skill in exploiting the profiteering which became epidemic under Indira Gandhi’s dominion. As Inder Malhotra duly noted, Although profiteering was not new in India:
People contemplated Indira Gandhi’s party, dedicated to bringing socialism to the country, to be cleaner and more honest than the earlier undivided Congress. But this turned out to be an unavailing hope. Conversely, compared with the dispersion of wealth by some of her close associates, the misconducts of the discarded association leaders, once looked upon as patron of corrupt Congressmen, began to emerge insignificantly.
Suitcases filled with money were said to be routinely taken to the Prime Minister’s residence. Former association member S.K. Patil is noted to have said that Mrs. Indira Gandhi did not even return those suitcases.
The Prime Minister is not likely to have paid close attention to the hesitant derivations of some of the funds which went into Congress’s money box. That was a matter which she left widely to her chief fundraiser, Lalit Narayan Mishra, Although she doubtless did not realize it? also, undertake Soviet money.
An attentive post is normally a good starting point for appointments and other operations. The magazine hereafter closed in 1986. Agents being agents, Igor, the KGB man in Bombay, tried to appoint Knightley, who caught on and diminished. The CIA was very intelligent and Knightley would never have predicted that he had been working for the CIA had Rositzke, under the presumption that Knightley already knew something, not exclaimed out the secret.
Conclusive Remarks
India was the play area of intelligence games amid the KGB and CIA. The KGB asserted they had ten Indian newspapers and one news organization upon their payroll and thousands of articles were set out in this passage. It is claimed to have financed several politicians, senior bureaucrats and it includes police officials, Foreign envoys, and members of Parliament. Assuredly, the CIA would not have lagged afterward in this type of activity. The surveillance case of the Larkin brothers in 1980 was an instance of the CIA’s successes. The game of suborning important Indian institutions had started early and by the 1960s the KGB had possessed a considerable hold on the Indian system. This was a definitive intelligence business, with Mrs. Gandhi’s code name being VANO in KGB data.
Endnotes-
- https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-kgb-papers-it-seemed-like-the-entire-country-was-for-sale/cid/1023636
- https://scroll.in/article/888360/mission-critical-how-the-cia-and-kgb-vied-for-dominant-propaganda-in-india-during-the-cold-war
- https://www.opindia.com/2020/08/indira-gandhi-mitrokhin-archive-india-ussr-kgb-funding-india-puppet/
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